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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
SCOT KEN SCUDERI, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020936-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion for failing to consider Scuderi's 
Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1? Utah Code Annotated § 
77-29-1 grants a trial court discretion for reviewing a determination that a defendant's 
charges should be dismissed pursuant to the Speedy Trial Statute. See State v. Coleman, 
2001 UT App 281,1J3, 34 P.3d 790. This issue was preserved in Scuderi's Motion to 
Dismiss (R. 289-90). 
In the alternative, whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a 
Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1? "When an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim 'is raised for the first time on appeal without a prior 
evidentiary hearing, it presents a question of law.'" State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, 
126, 61 P.3d 291 (quoting State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539 (Utah App. 1998). 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Scuderi's Motion To 
Dismiss where the trial court ruled that the police did not act in bad faith when it 
destroyed all physical evidence which might have exonerated Scuderi? This issue is 
reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 324, 
cert, denied 922 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998) This issue was preserved in Scuderi's Motion to 
Dismiss (R. 114-18) 
3. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a motion for a mistrial or 
request a curative instruction from the court regarding repeated testimony that Scuderi 
had been incarcerated in prison? "When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 'is 
raised for the first time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, it presents a 
question of law."' Holbert, 2002 UT App 426 at <|26 (citation omitted). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of all relevant statutory provisions is set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Scot Ken Scuderi appeals from the judgment, sentence, and commitment of the 
Third Judicial District Court after being convicted of possession of clandestine laboratory 
precursors and/or equipment, a first degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Scot Scuderi was charged by information filed in Third District Court on October 
18, 2000, with possession of clandestine laboratory equipment and/or precursors, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37d-4(l)(a) and/or (b) 
(R. 4). The State also sought to eijhance the charge pursuant to § 58-37d-5(l)(d), (f), 
and/or (g) (R. 5). On October 20, 2000, an amended information was filed which 
changed the offense to a first degree felony (R. 13). 
On November 9, 2000, a memo of demand for 120-day disposition was filed 
which listed an expiration date of March 31, 2001 (R. 17). The demand was signed by 
Scuderi on October 31, 2000, and received by the authorized prison agent on November 
7, 2000 (R. 20). 
On November 17, 2000, Deborah Kreeck Mendez, Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association, entered her appearance of counsel for Scuderi (R. 23). On November 28, 
2000, Kreeck Mendez was allowed to withdraw as Victor Gordon orally entered his 
appearance of counsel (R. 347 at 2). At this time a roll call appearance was continued 
for three weeks to December 14, 2000 (R. 347 at 2-3). 
On December 14, 2000, Gordon failed to appear at the roll call and Scuderi 
consented to a continuance until January 4, 2001 (R. 348 at 2-3). On January 4, 2001, 
Scuderi was represented by a Mr. (Gary) Bell as Gordon had undergone kidney surgery 
(R. 349). At this time the matter was set for a preliminary hearing as Scuderi was 
unwilling to waive his right to disposition within 120 days (R. 349 at 3). 
On January 11, 2001, a preliminary hearing was conducted before Judge William 
W. Barrett (R. 324). At the close of the hearing, Scuderi was bound-over for trial upon a 
finding of probable cause (R. 324 at 37). Scuderi was also arraigned and entered a plea 
of "not guilty" at this time (R. 324 at 37). Gordon, due to continuing health difficulties, 
was unable to attend the hearing and Bell again represented Scuderi. At the close of the 
hearing Bell requested that the trial court again appoint counsel for Scuderi (R. 324 at 37-
38). The trial court re-appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association to represent 
Scuderi (R. 324 at 38). 
On January 22, 2001, a scheduling conference was held before Judge Robin W. 
Reese (R. 43). At the hearing, counsel for the State raised the 120-day disposition and 
requested that a trial not be delayed (R. 350 at 3). At this time the State indicated that the 
120 day period would end on March 2, 2001 (R. 350 at 4). Accordingly, the trial court 
scheduled the trial for February 14-15, 2001 (R. 350 at 4). 
At a hearing held on February 9, 2001, Deborah Kreeck Mendez, because of an 
"unwaiveable conflict," was again allowed to withdraw as counsel for Scuderi and Otis 
Sterling, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, was appointed as defense counsel (R. 
351 at 2, 3). Sterling requested that the trial be continued (till May) to give him time to 
prepare for trial (R. 351 at 3). At this time, Scuderi again raised the issue of his 120-day 
disposition and did not verbally consent to the continuance (R. 351 at 4-5). In regards to 
the disposition notice in relationship to a possible continuance of the trial the following 
dialogue took place: 
4 
Court: ... If there is some loss of your right to exercise or enforce that 
request for disposition of detainers that you filed, Mr. Scuderi, by continuing this, you 
know, then a continuance won't help you at all in that way, if you see what I'm saying. 
Mr. Scuderi: No, I don't. 
Court: I mean it's your request for a continuance, or at least Counsel's 
request for a continuance, so the State won't be penalized because you've asked to 
continue the trial date. I'm assuming the State is prepared to go forward in the 14th? 
Ms. Coebergh: We are. 
Court: Okay. I'll grant the defendant's motion to continue the trial. 
(R. 351 at 4-5). The trial court continued the trial from February 14-15, 2001, to May 8-
9, 2001 (R. 351 at 5). 
On April 3, 2001, Sterling/Scuderi filed a motion to compel discovery and request 
for a hearing (R. 73). Scuderi's motion concerned discovery requested in the second 
supplemental request for discovery (R. 54-55) and included the identity and criminal 
history of the confidential informant referred to in Detective Daniel's 2/11/00 report and 
also a criminal history of Jeff Wilson (believed to be the confidential informant (R. 352 at 
4)) (R. 54-55, 73). 
On April 9, 2001, a motion hearing was held before Judge Reese in regards to the 
discovery issues (R. 352). At the hearing, the trial court requested that the parties submit 
written memoranda in regards to the issue of the confidential informant's identity (R. 352 
at 7). On April 18, 2001, Scuderi submitted a responsive memorandum as requested by 
the trial court (R. 75-77). On or about April 27, 2001, the State submitted their 
memoranda in opposition to the motion (R. 90-102). On May 1, 2001, Judge Reese 
issued a notice that the issue would be heard at a motion hearing on May 8, 2001 (R. 
103). 
On April 23, 2001, Sterling orally requested a continuance of the trial (R. 353 at 
3). Scuderi agreed to the continuance (R. 353 at 4). The motion to continue was granted 
and trial was rescheduled for August 7-8, 2001 (R. 353 at 5). 
On May 8, 2001, the discovery issue was addressed, and Judge Reese denied the 
motion concluding that Scuderi had not met his burden of demonstrating that the actual 
identity of the confidential informant is material and essential (R. 352 at 12). 
On May 14, 2001, the State filed a motion in limine to prohibit the defense from 
asking the identity of the confidential informant at trial (R. 104-06). On May 31, 2001, 
the trial court granted the motion (R. 108-09). 
On July 20, 2001, Scuderi filed a motion to suppress statements made to police on 
grounds that the statements were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights (R. 
111-13). Scuderi also filed at the same time, a motion to dismiss for failure to preserve 
exculpatory material and/or to prevent the State from introducing at trial evidence not 
preserved (R. 114-18). 
On July 25, 2001, the State filed a notice of intent to use 404(b) evidence and 
requested a hearing on the matter (R. 119-133). 
On July 26, 2001, Judge Reese set a hearing for July 31, 2001 (R. 134). 
On July 31, 2001, a hearing was held (R. 137-38, 354). At the hearing, Sterling 
indicated that Scuderi would not object to a continuance of the trial so that all motions 
and discovery issues can properly be resolved (R. 354 at 7). The trial court continued the 
motion hearing until August 16, 2001, and continued the trial to August 30-31, 2001 (R. 
354 at 11, 12). 
On August 16, 2001, a hearing was held where Scuderi's motion to dismiss and 
the State's motion in limine were discussed (R. 325). At the close of the hearing, the 
State raised a question as to whether it was appropriate for the Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association to represent Scuderi in this matter (R. 325 at 46). Deborah Kreeck Mendez 
was initially appointed to represent Scuderi (R. 325 at 46). However, according to the 
State, she had a conflict because she had previously represented a witness, Felice 
Mahoney-whose garage the laboratory precursor and/or equipment were found (R. 325 at 
46). Kreeck Mendez withdrew and Sterling entered his appearance. At the hearing on 
August 16, 2001, counsel for the State stated that she had learned that "instead of 
properly distancing herself from this particular matter after she had been appointed by 
this court to represent Mr. Scuderi she undertook to interview her former client Felice 
Mahoney about this particular clandestine lab incident" (R. 325 at 47). Counsel for the 
State learned this information from Mahoney (R. 325 at 47). In addition, she indicated 
that Sterling had approached her and indicated that Kreeck Mendez wished to be called as 
a witness in Scuderi's case in order to testify regarding a conversation with Mahoney (R. 
325 at 47). Judge Reese then stated, "Mr. Sterling, that would sound like a conflict, if it's 
true. If one of your associates in your office previously represented one of the State's 
witnesses and has now undertaken to represent and give legal advice in connection with 
this case, isn't there a major conflict there?" (R. 325 at 47-48). Sterling explained that 
Kreeck Mendez talked with Mahoney simply to see whether Mahoney had ever been 
represented by LDA (R. 325 at 48). Kreeck Mendez discovered from Mahoney that she 
was representing another individual possibly involved with the meth lab in Mahoney's 
garage, immediately realized the conflict, and withdrew as Scuderi's counsel (R. 325 at 
48-50). Sterling further explained there was no real conflict regarding Kreeck Mendez 
since she never represented Mahoney (R. 325 at 52, 55). However, the State maintained 
that there was a conflict (R. 325 at 56). The trial court set a hearing for August 23 to 
resolve this issue (R. 325 at 59). 
On August 23, 2001, Kreeck Mendez filed an affidavit with the trial court that 
addressed the conflict of interest issue (R. 168-73). In summary, the affidavit stated the 
following: One, Kreeck Mendez (and her legal assistant) researched whether the Salt 
Lake Defender Association had ever represented Felice Fontanez (Mahoney) and 
discovered no indication that the association had represented her in the past (R. 169). In 
addition, Kreeck Mendez stated that she had never represented Fontanez/Mahoney; and 
that since the August 16, 2001, hearing counsel for the State had checked the court 
records to verify this fact (R. 170). Two, that on or about January 29, 2001, 
Fontanez/Mahoney called Kreeck Mendez and indicated that she was calling in regards to 
Scuderi(R. 170). 
On August 24, 2001, Sterling filed a motion to continue the trial on grounds that 
an essential defense witness, Dave Browning of the Hurricane Police Department, is 
unavailable on August 30-31 (R. 174-75). 
During a hearing on August 24, 2001, the possible conflict of interest by defense 
counsel was again discussed (R. 331). Scuderi had not been transported and was not 
present at this hearing (R. 331 at 2, 15). During the course of discussion, Judge Reese 
inquired whether Sterling would object to reassigning Scuderi's case to conflict counsel 
(R. 331 at 15). Sterling stated that he did not object if it was the "cleanest and best way" 
to resolve the issue (R. 331 at 15-16). Sterling also stated "I've been involved with Mr. 
Scuderi, I think he-he trusts me as his attorney, feels comfortable with me and quite 
frankly, I'm prepared to try his case. But if—if it's a matter of cleaning up any of these 
issues that are existing, I certainly don't have an objection to handing it off, but for the-
for the Court to know, I'm prepared to try this case and I think Mr. Scuderi feels 
comfortable with me proceeding as his attorney" (R. 331 at 16). Ultimately Judge Reese 
continued the trial and the hearing until Scuderi could be present (R. 331 at 18). Judge 
Reese also indicated that she would "probably" appoint conflict counsel (R. 331 at 18). 
Judge Reese also indicated that she saw no prejudice to Scuderi because "a lot of those 
delays have been due to Mr. Scuderi's own problems" and that "he hasn't objected to any 
of those postponements" (R. 331 at 19). At this point, counsel for the State reminded the 
court of the 120-day disposition (R. 331 at 19). 
The trial court orally denied Scuderi's motion to dismiss/suppress at the August 
24, 2001, hearing (R. 331 at 20, 187-88, 189-90). 
On August 30, 2001, the trial court signed an order on the State's 404(b) motion 
(R. 191-92). The State was ordered "not to admit in its case-in-chief that the Defendant 
was on parole nor the offense for which Defendant was on parole" (R. 192). 
On August 30, 2001, Sterling filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on grounds 
that "a conflict exists between this Defendant and the Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association" (R. 193). The motion also requested that Susanne Gustin and Sharon L. 
Preston be appointed to represent Scuderi (R. 193). The trial court granted the motion on 
September 5, 2001 (R. 195). At a hearing on August 30, the trial court explained that 
because of the apparent conflict between Scuderi and LDA, new counsel would be 
appointed (R. 355 at 3-4). The trial court then scheduled September 11, 2001, to set a 
trial date (R. 355 at 4). 
On September 5, 2001, Sharon Preston entered her appearance as counsel of 
record for Scuderi (R. 197). On the same date, Preston filed a motion to continue the 
September 11, 2001, scheduling conference on the basis that she had a previous 
commitment in another court (R. 199). The hearing was continued to October 4, 2001 
(R. 203). 
On October 4, 2001, Preston explained her readiness to proceed with trial (R. 363 
at 3). The 120-day disposition was not discussed and the trial court gave two dates for a 
trial: one in November and one in December (R. 363 at 3). Preston had a conflict with 
the November date, so trial was set for December 19-20, 2001 (R. 363 at 3). 
On December 17, 2001, the State filed a motion to continue the trial which had 
been scheduled for December 19-21, 2001 (R. 210-13). The basis for the motion was that 
one of the State's witnesses was having surgery and was unavailable to testify on these 
dates (R. 210). On the same date a hearing was held on the State's motion (R. 356). At 
the hearing, Scuderi voiced his opposition to stipulating to the chain of custody (which 
the affected witness would testify to) and also his objection to continuing the trial (R. 356 
at 5). The trial court granted the motion to continue upon a finding of good cause (R. 356 
at 5). The State expressed it would be ready for trial mid-January 2002, but the trial court 
said, "we can't go then, practically speaking. The earliest we could practically go would 
in 
be sometime after the Olympics, late February early March" (R. 356 at 5). The trial court 
then set the trial for March 20-22, 2002 (R. 356 at 5-6). Again, the State did not discuss 
the 120-day disposition (R. 356 at 5-6). 
On March 20-22, 2002, a jury trial was held (R. 326, 327, 328). After 
deliberation, the jury convicted Scuderi of a clandestine laboratory violation (R. 228). 
On May 6, 2002, a hearing was held (R. 357). At the hearing Preston requested 
that sentencing not be imposed so that a written motion to arrest judgment based on the 
sufficiency of the evidence could be filed (R. 357 at 3). Preston also wanted time to 
prepare a memoranda based on Scuderi's demand for a 120-day disposition (R. 357 at 3). 
On August 20, 2002, Scuderi was sentenced to a mandatory term of five years to 
life at the Utah State Prison (R. 253-54, 330). The sentence was ordered to be 
consecutive to the case Scuderi was already serving (R. 254). On September 16, 2002, 
Scuderi filed a motion to reconsider the issue of whether the sentence should be served 
consecutive to, or concurrent with, the previous sentence (R. 255-288). 
On September 20, 2002, Scuderi, pro se, filed a notice of appeal in Third District 
Court (R. 289-90). Scuderi also indicated that he would like to submit a motion to 
dismiss on the 120-day disposition right to a speedy trial himself because his trial counsel 
failed to do so (R. 289). Attached to the same letter, Scuderi filed pro se a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to the 120-day disposition, explaining that Preston repeatedly failed to 
bring this issue up before trial (R. 289). 
On October 18, 2002, a review hearing was held (R. 303, 332). The trial court 
denied Scuderi's motion to reconsider but upon motion amended the judgment, sentence 
and commitment to reflect sentencing on this date (R. 303, 332 at 2, 4-5). At the hearing 
Preston stated that Scuderi "has asked me, throughout my representation of him, to do a 
motion to dismiss on failure to respond to a-request for 120-day disposition, so a speedy 
trial thing. I had reviewed things and felt that there was no basis for that and one of the 
things that he wanted to do today in his letter was make that motion. Fve told him that he 
can't do that and-now that the trial's over and he's been committed to the prison, but it's 
something that his attorney maybe could address on appeal, in an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim" (R. 332 at 3). Scuderi reiterated the fact that he "submitted the motion on 
the 120 days position" (R. 332 at 5). The trial court asked whether the September 20 
letter, wherein Scuderi set forth his motion to dismiss based on the 120-day disposition, 
was "the first expression here in Court of the defendant's intent to pursue a disposition of 
detainers[?]" (R. 332 at 6). Preston responded, "In Court. But I will make for the record, 
I'll say that he did express that wish to me but that I didn't — feel that there was any 
grounds for it. So, he can raise that on appeal, I think, by himself (R. 332 at 6). The 
trial court then disregarded the motion to dismiss and failed to set a hearing upon the 
matter (R. 332 at 6-7). 
On October 31, 2002, Preston filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Scuderi 
(R. 305). Preston also filed a notice of appeal for Scuderi (R. 308). 
On February 7, 2003, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4) (R. 315). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Testimony of Scott Daniels 
Officer Scott Daniels is a police officer for the City of South Salt Lake, and in 
January of 2000, he was informed that a clandestine laboratory may be operating at 615 
East Leland, South Salt Lake (R. 326: 60, 63). The house at that address is a single-
family dwelling, with a garage that is not attached to the house (R. 326: 64). Daniels had 
previously been to the same house on official police business, and had spoken with the 
resident Felice Mahoney (R. 326: 65). 
On January 28, 2000, Daniels went to the house at that location around 11:00 p.m., 
and watched for traffic coming and going from the house (R. 326: 64-65). After about a 
half hour, he saw a vehicle leave the residence, and then pulled the vehicle over after he 
ran the license plate on his computer and discovered that it was not insured (R. 326: 65-
66). 
The driver had a suspended driver's license and the only passenger admitted he 
had just smoked marijuana within the past few days (R. 326: 66). Daniels drove one of 
the males back to the house so someone with a valid driver's license could retrieve the 
car (R. 326: 66). Mahoney answered the door and Daniels asked if he could come in and 
talk with her (R. 326: 67). Daniels was in plain clothes and accompanied by Officer 
Hatch (R. 326:67). 
Mahoney invited the officers and the other person from the car into her home (R. 
326: 67). Daniels told her that "somebody told me that there was a clandestine laboratory 
out in her garage" (R. 326: 68). Mahoney told Daniels that there was nothing in the 
garage (R. 326: 68). Daniels then asked Mahoney if he could search her home and 
garage and she consented (R. 326: 68). 
As Daniels searched the house, he told Mahoney that if they found a meth lab 
there with children in the home, she could have her kids taken away (R. 326: 87, 89). 
Mahoney "became very emotional, almost crying" (R. 326: 68). She told Daniels that 
she wanted to speak with him privately (R. 326: 69). Mahoney then told him that there 
was a meth lab out in the garage, that her fingerprints may be on it, and "that she had let a 
male store the lab there." (R. 326: 69, 93). 
At first Mahoney would not tell Daniels whose meth lab it was, but after they 
searched the garage and discovered the lab and after Daniels told her she could go to jail, 
"she told me the guy's name was Scot Scuderi" (R. 326: 69, 91). Daniels also testified 
that he did not call DCFS even though a meth lab was found in the garage, nor did he 
arrest Mahoney even though she committed a crime for storing a meth lab in her garage 
(R. 326: 89, 92). 
Daniels testified that he saw a plastic bin container, vent bags, different chemicals, 
and some round bottom flasks in the garage (R. 326: 70-71). Daniels also testified that he 
saw a "gallon jug with a white, milky substance in it" (R. 326: 73). 
After discovering these materials, Daniels left the garage and contacted the DEA 
to process the materials and clean the garage (R. 326: 71). 
Mahoney then told Daniels that Scuderi came by the house just before he got 
there, and that he took "some stuff out of there" (R. 326: 74-75). However, Daniels 
testified that while he had the house under surveillance at that time, he did not see anyone 
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approach or leave the house (R. 326: 84). She also gave Daniels a description of the car 
Scuderi drove, and while Daniels was standing in the front yard while others were 
processing the laboratory, "a vehicle matching the description of... Scuderi's drove by." 
(R. 326: 75). Daniels got in his car to follow, but he could not find the vehicle (R. 326: 
75). 
Over two weeks later, Daniels arranged an interview with Scuderi, and advised 
him that he was a suspect in the case and of his Miranda rights (R. 326: 76). Scuderi 
admitted that he knew Mahoney, but stated that he had nothing to do with the lab (R. 326: 
77). Scuderi admitted that he was storing some milk jugs at that house which contained 
pseudoephedrine and that they were of value to him since he could still extract some 
ephedrine from them (R. 326: 77). Scuderi also told Daniels that his fingerprints may be 
found because he had taken some of the items in the garage out of cardboard boxes 
because he was going to move the lab for Mahoney so she would not get in trouble (R. 
326: 78, 79). 
Scuderi further told him that he was aware where the vent bags were located in the 
garage and that kitty litter was in them (R. 326: 78). Scuderi also knew that liquid would 
not be found in the flat-bottom flasks (R. 326: 79). Scuderi told Daniels that his car was 
at the house that day, but he was not in his car at the time (R. 326: 109). 
Daniels testified that the garage where the materials were found is 15 to 20 feet to 
another residence (R. 326: 80). 
Testimony of Mike McNaughton 
Mike McNaughton is a police officer for the City of South Salt Lake, and that on 
January 28, 2000, he was called to the scene at 615 East Leland where the lab materials 
were found in this case in order to assist in the investigation and processing of the lab (R. 
326: 115). McNaughton could not remember any children being present at the scene (R. 
326: 139). 
McNaughton took digital photographs of the scene, containing pictures of an 
acetone can, a coffee cup, and a container with clear liquid in it (R. 326: 116-17). 
Photographs were also taken of other items, including a water bucket filled with kitty 
litter, a round-bottomed flask, milk jugs, glass containers, a glass condenser column, and 
other various items which McNaughton testified are usually found at meth lab sites (R. 
326: 120-23). Many of the items had brown and reddish color stains which were likely 
discolored by cooking meth (R. 326: 125). Most of the items were in a bag or container 
of some kind and were not visible in plain view (R. 326: 135). 
After processing, sampling, and fingerprinting the items associated with the lab, 
the items were all destroyed (R. 326: 130). 
McNaughton was also present when Daniels interviewed Scuderi (R. 326: 131). 
Scuderi told them that he was not involved, although he did admit that he was storing 
some milk jugs at the residence which contained an ephedrine solution (R. 326: 131). 
Testimony of Michael Renckert 
Michael Renckert works for the Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and 
Parole, and is certified in processing clandestine laboratories (R. 326: 155-56). Renckert 
helped process the items found at 615 East Leland, and Jeff Paye, Mike McNaughton, 
and Scott Daniels also assisted him (R. 326: 157). 
Renckert testified that the items found were destroyed before trial and this is 
standard procedure because of the hazardous nature of the components (R. 326: 160). 
Testimony of Felice Mahoney 
Felice Mahoney testified that she met Scuderi when he "had gotten out of prison" 
and that she had known him for about eight months (R. 327: 183, 188). Mahoney was 
renting the house on Leland Avenue (R. 327: 184). Mahoney knew where Scuderi lived 
and she had been to his house (R. 327: 185). 
Scuderi asked Mahoney if he could store some things at her house, but he 
originally did not tell her what he needed to store (R. 327: 185). The prosecution asked 
Mahoney why Scuderi wanted to store items in her garage, and Mahoney said, "The 
particular items we are talking about, he was going to go back to prison, and asked if he 
could put them at my place." (R. 327: 186). 
Mahoney testified that Scuderi brought over a pressure cooker, a Chinese wok, 
and "some jugs" and on the day he brought those items over, she saw him standing over 
the wok with "stuff poured in it, and simmering" (R. 327: 187, 232). Scuderi told 
Mahoney that he was preparing to make meth (R. 327: 187). 
The prosecutor asked Mahoney at what time did Scuderi bring these things to her 
garage for the first time and when did the police find it, and Mahoney replied, "It was - -
when he was supposed to go back to prison?" (R. 327: 189). After this response, 
Mahoney finally said that Scuderi brought the items over about a week before the police 
came and found them (R. 327: 189). 
Mahoney admitted that she was recently convicted for possession of 
methamphetamine and that she used to be a cocaine addict (R. 327: 191-92). Mahoney 
also used meth with Scuderi and had bought meth from him (R. 327: 193). 
After Mahoney saw Scuderi in her garage with the wok and other items, she asked 
Scuderi to box them up and take them (R. 327: 193-94). Scuderi took all the items out of 
the garage that day (R. 327: 231). Mahoney then painted her garage to cover up the 
stains left on the wall from cooking meth there (R. 327: 236). 
Mahoney discovered more items in her garages a few days after she first asked 
Scuderi to take the meth lab items out (R. 327: 232). Scuderi was again cooking meth, 
and Mahoney asked him to take the items out of her garage (R. 327: 233). Scuderi came 
and took some of the items "three or four days" prior to when the police came (R. 327: 
194-95). Scuderi also came back and took more of the items "a few minutes" before the 
police came that night, but did not take all of it (R. 327: 197, 248). Scuderi removed 
jugs, cups, cat litter, and a pressure cooker from her garage before the police came (R. 
327: 199). 
Mahoney testified that the items pictured in State's Exhibit #'s 1-18 belonged 
mostly to Scuderi (R. 327: 199-201). 
Mahoney testified that she takes runaway kids into her home, and at this time, 
Cody, from Florida was living with her (R. 327: 195). Cody also knew that a meth lab 
was in the garage (R. 327: 195). Cody was the individual that Officer Daniels stopped in 
the car and brought back to Mahoney's house because he did not have a valid driver's 
license (R. 327: 197). 
Mahoney's two children were in the home when the police came that night and 
found the items in the garage (R. 327: 197). Mahoney knew that a meth lab was in her 
garage before the police came, but she kept her kids at her house anyway (R. 327: 242). 
Mahoney wanted the meth lab items in her garage taken away, but she did not call the 
police "because I am not that dumb" (R. 327: 243). 
Mahoney kept the garage locked and she had to open it for the police to search it 
(R. 327: 198). Mahoney had a key to the garage, and Cody and Scuderi "probably" had a 
key as well (R. 327: 198). Mahoney also testified that Jeff and Kim stored items in the 
garage (R. 327: 198). 
Mahoney corresponded with Scuderi through letters and she was still friendly with 
him after the police searched her garage and seized the meth lab (R. 327: 215). In one 
letter, referring to Scuderi speaking to Officer Daniels, it stated, "I told him that my prints 
would be on the milk jugs, as I moved them one day. I forgot that the methanol fumes 
wouldn't let prints stay there. Duh" (R. 327: 208). Mahoney testified that Scuderi 
wanted her to lie and say that the meth lab items were not Scuderi's (R. 327: 261-64). 
The prosecutor asked Mahoney what other form of communication she had with 
Scuderi at this time, other than through letters, and Mahoney stated, "Scot [Scuderi] had 
gotten out of prison. He was out. We were trying to help track down some items that 
were stolen" (R. 327: 261). At this point, the judge interrupted and told Mahoney to 
answer the question asked (R. 327: 261-62). Mahoney also testified that she was writing 
Scuderi not because of friendship, but rather "out of respect, obligation .... I felt, 
basically, guilty because he was in prison" (R. 327: 216). Defense counsel finally 
objected to this prior bad evidence, but the trial court overruled the objection (R. 327: 
216). 
Testimony of Jeff Payne 
Jeff Payne is employed with the Salt Lake City Police Department (R. 327: 270). 
Payne testified that the primary precursors for making methamphetamine are red 
phosphorous, pseudoephedrine, and iodine (R. 327: 274). 
These three materials are mixed in a certain ratio, producing its own heat (R. 327: 
277). External heat can be added to speed the process up (R. 327: 277-78). This mixture 
is condensed, with the toxic vapors going through a venting system and the liquid 
through a condenser (R. 327: 278-79). 
Payne helped process the meth lab in question, and among the items found were 
reaction vessels, vent hose, vent bags, glass column, condenser column, solvents, and 
Red Devil lye and other acids (R. 327: 281). Pseudoephedrine soaking in a solvent was 
also recovered (R. 327: 282). There had been some manufacturing process at one point 
with all these materials, and it was his opinion that all these items were put together to 
manufacture methamphetamine (R. 327: 284). Payne further stated that it was his 
opinion that this lab had been operating for some time because of the staining on the wall 
due to the iodine vapors (R. 327: 285). 
Testimony of David Browning 
David Browning was a detective for the City of South Salt Lake in 1999, and he is 
currently a police officer for the city of Hurricane, Utah (R. 327: 287). Browning 
conducted a search at the home located at 615 Leland Avenue in June 1999, and he found 
forged checks and certain narcotic precursors (R. 327: 288). Among the precursor 
chemicals, he found Red Devil lye and sodium hydroxide (R. 327: 289-90). 
Stipulation of Evidence 
The State and defense stipulated that fingerprints from some of the materials found 
in the garage were sent to the Utah Crime Lab, but there were no usable prints (R. 326: 
112). Both sides stipulated that this evidence does not suggest that Scuderi's prints were 
on the materials or were not on the materials (R. 326: 112). 
Testimony of Nancy Vaughn 
Nancy Vaughn testified that she knows both Mahoney and Scuderi, and that she 
had visited Mahoney at 615 Leland Avenue (R. 327: 293). Mahoney told Vaughn on 
several occasions that three guys were operating a meth lab out of her garage: Gordon, 
Cody, and Brian (R. 327: 295-96). Mahoney told Vaughn that because it was being 
operated out of her garage, Mahoney could deny any knowledge of the operation (R. 327: 
295). 
Mahoney further told Vaughn that in January of 2000, police were watching her, 
and she wanted Scuderi and John "to come get the stuff of Cody's out of the garage, 
because he is not here5' (R. 327: 298). 
On cross examination, the prosecutor asked Vaughn about a card that she received 
from Scuderi, and the prosecutor then asked her, "Where did they come from?" (R. 327: 
304). Vaughn answered, "From the prison" (R. 327: 304). Defense counsel objected and 
it was sustained (R. 327: 304). 
Testimony of James Scuderi 
James Scuderi testified that he is Scot Scuderi's father (R. 327: 305). During the 
week of January 28, 2000, Scuderi and several of his friends helped him move out of 
rented facilities (R. 327: 306). Scuderi had been working for him since the early summer 
of 1999, and during the week of January 28, 2000, Scuderi worked with him Monday 
through Friday, from 7:00 p.m. until midnight or 1:00 a.m. (R. 327: 307). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Scuderi asserts that the State failed to bring this case to trial within the 120-day 
disposition period pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1. Scuderi filed a Motion to 
Dismiss pro se, asserting that the State failed to comply with his demand for a speedy 
trial and that his trial counsel failed to raise this issue before the trial court. However, the 
trial court disregarded the motion and failed to review the proceeding as required by § 
77-29-1(4). Scuderi asks this Court to reverse his conviction with prejudice because the 
State failed to comply with Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1. 
In the alternative that this Court finds that Scuderi's first issue was not adequately 
preserved, Scuderi asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a 
motion to dismiss after the State failed to prosecute the case within the 120-day period. 
Scuderi repeatedly asserted in open court his right to a speedy trial, even though the 
burden to comply with § 77-29-1 is fully on the State. Moreover, Scuderi repeatedly 
asked his trial counsel to file a motion to dismiss, but trial counsel failed to do so. 
Accordingly, Scuderi asks this Court to dismiss his conviction with prejudice because of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Scuderi also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the 
police did not act in bad faith by destroying physical evidence that might have exonerated 
him. By testing for fingerprints on only one or two of the items and then destroying all of 
the items without further testing, the police indicated by their own conduct that this 
evidence could form the basis for exonerating Scuderi. The officer's knew or should 
have known that the destroyed evidence had potential value to Scuderi in that it might 
have exonerated him. Further testing might have revealed that Scuderi's prints were not 
on any of the items; or the results might have uncovered other individuals' fingerprints on 
the laboratory items, either of which might exonerate him. Accordingly, the trial court 
abused its discretion by not granting the motion to dismiss. 
Finally, Scuderi asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
inadmissible testimony that he had been incarcerated in prison, in violation of Rule 
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The State's key witness testified at least five times 
that Scuderi had recently served time in prison. When trial counsel finally objected to the 
third remark, she failed to make a motion for mistrial or request a curative instruction 
from the trial court. Moreover, the prosecutor purposefully elucidated from a defense 
witness that Scuderi recently served time in prison. Trial counsel's failure to make a 
motion for a mistrial or request a curative instruction deprived Scuderi of his rights to a 
fair trial and presumption of innocence because this evidence impermissibly impressed 
upon the minds of the jurors that he was more likely to have committed this offense for 
which he was being tried than if he had previously led a blameless life. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO 
CONSIDER SCUDERTS MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE 
TRIAL WAS NOT BROUGHT WITHIN THE 120 DAY 
DISPOSITION PERIOD 
On October 31, 2000, Scuderi signed a demand for 120-day disposition, requiring 
the State to bring this case to trial within 120 days. However, this case was not brought 
to trial until March 20, 2002, about 17 months after the 120-day disposition was filed. 
Scuderi filed pro se a Motion to Dismiss based on Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1, but 
the trial court disregarded the motion and failed to hold a hearing on the matter. Scuderi 
asserts that the trial court abused its discretion for failing to consider his motion to 
dismiss the case because the State failed to comply with § 77-29-1 by not bringing the 
case to trial within the 120-day disposition order. 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1 grants a trial court discretion for reviewing a 
determination that a defendant's charges should be dismissed pursuant to the Speedy 
Trial Statute. See State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, | 3 , 34 P.3d 790. 
"Pursuant to section 77-29-1, whenever a Utah prisoner has an untried indictment 
or information, that prisoner can demand that the charges be brought to trial within 120 
days of the demand." State v. Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146, %6, 71 P.3d 184. "Section 
77-29-1 directs the court to dismiss criminal charges against a defendant if that defendant 
is not tried within 120 days of invoking section 77-29-1(4), unless 'good cause [is] shown 
in open court.'" Id. (quoting Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1(3) to (4)). The matter is 
also dismissed with prejudice. Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146 at [^9; accord Utah Code 
Annotated §77-29-1(4). 
The burden of complying with the statute rests with the prosecutor. State v. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d 911,915 (Utah 1998). Once a prisoner has delivered a disposition 
request, "the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to have the defendant's matter heard 
within the statutory period." Id. Thus, a defendant need not even object to a trial setting 
that falls outside the required time period. Id; accord State v. Peterson, 810 P.2d 421, 424 
(Utah 1991). Instead, the prosecutor must "notify the court that a detainer notice has 
been filed," and he must otherwise "make a good faith effort to comply with the statute." 
/feato«,958P.3dat915. 
Determining whether a motion to dismiss pursuant to the detainer statute is proper 
"requires a two-step inquiry. First, we must determine when the 120-day period 
commenced and when it expired. Second, if the trial was held beyond the 120 day 
period, we must then determine whether cgood cause' excused the delay." Wagenman, 
2003 UT App 146 at [^8 (citations omitted). 
Scuderi signed the 120-day disposition demand for a speedy trial on October 31, 
2000 (R. 20). Scuderi also filed pro se a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to § 77-29-1 on 
September 20, 2002 (R. 289-90). 
A. The Detainer Period Commenced on November 7, 2000. 
By the statute's plain terms, "the 120-day period commences on the date written 
notice is delivered 'to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any 
appropriate agent of the same.'" State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 916 (Utah 1998) (quoting 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1(1)). The record is clear that Scuderi signed the demand 
for 120-day disposition on October 31, 2000, and it was received by the authorized prison 
agent on November 7, 2000 (R. 20). 
B. The Detainer Period Expired April 12, 2001. 
The 120th day after November 7, 2000, was March 6, 2001. However, "A finding 
of good cause' that will excuse failure of the prosecution to bring a defendant to trial 
within the time required means (1) delay caused by the defendant - such as asking for a 
continuance; or (2) 'a relatively short delay caused by unforeseen problems arising 
immediately prior to trial.5" Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146 at f^lO (quoting Coleman, 
2001 UT App 281, %69 34 P.3d 790). This is because "when a prisoner himself acts to 
delay the trial, he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive his right to a speedy 
trial." Id. Accordingly, the "disposition period [is] extended by the amount of time during 
which the defendant himself has created delay." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916 (citing State v. 
Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982)). Moreover, "Section 77-29-1 provides that 
all determinations of good cause shall be 'shown in open court, with the prisoner or his 
counsel being present.'" Wagenrnan, 2003 UT App 146 at [^11 (quoting Utah Code 
Annotated §77-29-1(3)). 
In Wagenman, the defendant demanded a 120-day disposition of January 18, 2001. 
2003 UT App 146 at ^2. The trial court set an initial hearing for March 9, and at that 
hearing, set the preliminary hearing for March 30. Id. at %3. However, Wagenman's 
counsel failed to appear at the preliminary hearing on March 30 and the preliminary 
hearing was rescheduled for April 13. Id. A one-day trial was ultimately set for June 4. 
Id. On May 31, the trial court, sua sponte, rescheduled Wagenman's trial to June 25 
because of a case with higher priority. Id. at %A. 
Wagenman filed a motion to dismiss on June 19, claiming the charges were not 
brought within 120 days of the demand. Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146 at %5. The trial 
court denied the motion and Wagenman appealed. Id. 
This Court concluded that "the State has an affirmative obligation to ensure that 
good cause is 'shown in open court."' Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146 at [^15 (quoting 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1(3)). This Court found that the "State improperly 
deferred to the trial court's desire to reschedule Wagenman's trial without requesting a 
hearing .... [and] requesting] that the trial court make its determination of good cause in 
open court and to ask the court to create a record in support of its good cause 
determination." Id. The case was reversed with prejudice because good cause for 
delaying the trial outside of the 120-day demand could not be shown on the record. Id. at 
H16. 
In State v. Peterson, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991), Peterson filed a 120-day 
disposition on July 12, 1989. Id. at 422. On September 6, 1989, his public defender 
requested new counsel because of conflicts with Peterson. Id. This request was denied, 
and without objection, trial was set for February 15, 1990, 218 days after the notice of 
disposition. Id. In part, the trial court denied the motion because no objection was made 
to scheduling the trial beyond 120 days and because the delay allowed time for Peterson 
and his counsel to resolve their differences. Id. at 423. 
The Utah Supreme Court concluded that § 77-29-1 "clearly places the burden of 
complying with the statute on the prosecutor," and Peterson "was not required to object 
to the trial date in order to maintain his rights under section 77-29-1." Peterson, 810 P.2d 
at 424. The Court also held that "[t]he conclusion that the delay was for the purpose of 
allowing time for defendant and his counsel to resolve their conflicts... cannot be used to 
support a reasonable basis for the finding of good cause." Id. at 427. The charges were 
dismissed with prejudice. Id. 
Similarly, in State v. Heaton, the State did not prosecute a defendant's case within 
120 days because of a clerk's error. 958 P.2d at 915. The trial court found that the clerk's 
error constituted "good cause" under § 77-29-1, but the Utah Supreme Court concluded 
that the State was responsible for keeping the case moving forward and the State had the 
"duty to notify the court that a detainer notice has been filed and to make a good faith 
effort to comply with the statute." Id. However, the defendant also claimed that his trial 
counsel's scheduling conflict with the set trial date within the 120-day period did not 
constitute good cause to accommodate a later date. Id. at 916. The Court held that 
extending the trial date to accommodate defense counsel's schedule constitutes "good 
cause" under section 77-29-1(3). Id. at 917. 
Finally, in State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, 34 P.3d 790, the trial court 
rescheduled the defendant's preliminary hearing at his request. Id. at ^ | 12, 13. The State 
"passively accepted [defendant's request," but then claimed on appeal that rescheduling 
the preliminary hearing constituted a waiver of the 120-day period. Id. at \Y5. 
This Court held that the State "may not passively accept a defendant's delay of the 
preliminary hearing/5 "knowing that it had or could soon have an obligation to bring the 
matter to trial within 120 days ... and claim the delay kept the prosecution from meeting 
its burden." Coleman, 2001 UT App 281 at ^ |14. 
Here, Scuderi filed a 120-day disposition on November 7? 2000 (R. 20). Scuderi's 
second defense counsel, Victor Gordon, requested that roll call appearance be continued 
from November 28, 2000, until December 14, 2000 (R. 347 at 2-3). This tolled the 120-
day period 16 days. 
On December 14, 2000, Gordon failed to appear and Scuderi consented to a 
continuance until January 4, 2001, tolling the 120-day period another 21 days for a total 
of 37 days tolled (R. 348 at 2-3). 
On January 4, Scuderi was represented by a Gary Bell as Gordon had undergone 
kidney surgery (R. 349). The matter was set for a preliminary hearing on January 11, 
2001, as Scuderi was unwilling to waive his right to disposition within 120 days (R. 349 
at 3). 
At the preliminary hearing on January 11, the trial court re-appointed the Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association as Scuderi's trial counsel and set the scheduling conference 
for January 22, 2001 (R. 324 at 37-38). 
During the scheduling conference on January 22, 2001, the State raised the 120-
day disposition and requested that a trial date not be delayed (R. 350 at 3). Accordingly, 
the trial court scheduled the trial for February 14-15, 2001 (R. 350 at 4). 
At a hearing held on February 9, 2001, Deborah Kreeck Mendez again asked to be 
allowed to withdraw as counsel for Scuderi because of an "unwaiveable conflict" (R. 351 
at 2). Scuderi did not want Kreeck Mendez to withdraw, but the trial court allowed it (R. 
351 at 2-3). The trial court instead appointed Otis Sterling as Scuderi's counsel, and 
Sterling requested a continuance in this matter (R. 351 at 3). At this time, Scuderi again 
raised the issue of his 120-day disposition and did not consent to the continuance (R. 351 
at 4-5). The trial court then asked Scuderi whether he would waive the request for 
disposition: 
Court: ... If there is some loss of your right to exercise or enforce that request for 
disposition of detainers that you filed, Mr. Scuderi, by continuing this, you 
know, then a continuance won't help you at all in that way, if you see what 
I'm saying. 
Scuderi: No, I don't. 
(R. 351 at 4-5). Without addressing Scuderi's concern or determining whether Scuderi 
consented to a continuance, the trial court ordered a continuance until May 8-9, 2001 (R. 
351 at 5). 
Scuderi asserts that the total time tolled that can be attributed to him for delays 
between November 7, 2000, until March 6, 2001, the 120 day period, is the period of 37 
days accounting for the continuances of roll call (R. 347 at 2-3; 348 at 203). Thus, the 
State had the duty to make sure that Scuderi was brought to trial no later than April 12, 
2001 in order to comply with Utah Code Annotate § 77-29-1. However, the trial court set 
the trial date well outside this 120-day period, up until May 8, 2001 (R. 351 at 5). 
in 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1 clearly placed the burden of complying with the 
statute on the prosecutor. Moreover, any good cause determination to delay trial must be 
"shown in open court." Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146 at <|[15 (quoting § 77-29-1(3)). 
Instead of continuing the trial date outside of the 120-day period, the trial court should 
have determined on the record "in open court" whether Scuderi was willing to waive the 
120-day disposition period for a good cause continuance in order for his trial counsel to 
get "up to speed" on the case or whether he wanted to still be tried within the disposition 
period, no later than April 12, 2001. Accordingly, Scuderi's conviction must be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
C Alternatively, the State Failed to Comply With the Statute By Allowing The 
Trial To Be Continued Until March 20, 2002. 
Alternatively, if the State can show good cause for continuing the trial beyond 
April 12, 2001, Scuderi asserts that the State failed to comply with § 77-29-1 when it 
allowed the trial to be continued until March 20, 2002, about 17 months after Scuderi 
properly filed the 120-day disposition. 
After the State failed to bring Scuderi to trial by the April 12 deadline, Scuderi 
consented to the trial being continued from May 8 until August 7, 2001 (R. 353 at 4-5). 
Then, on July 31, 2001, Scuderi further consented to the trial being rescheduled until 
August 30, 2001, in order to allow all motion and discovery issues to be properly 
resolved (R. 354 at 7, 11, 12). Thus, the detainer period was tolled a total of 114 days. 
However, at a hearing on August 16, the State questioned the LDA's further 
representation of Scuderi due to a conflict of interest (R. 325 at 46). The State claimed 
that one of the LDA attorneys, Kreeck Mendez, who initially represented Scuderi, also 
represented the State's key witness, Felice Mahoney - whose garage the laboratory 
precursor and/or equipment were found (R. 325 at 46). The State further claimed that 
Kreeck Mendez inappropriately interviewed Mahoney and wanted to testify against her at 
trial, even though she represented Mahoney before (R. 325 at 46-47). Scuderi's attorney, 
who also works for the LDA, contradicted the State's claim (R. 325 at 48, 52, 55). 
Sterling maintained that Kreeck Mendez never represented Mahoney and that there was 
no conflict of interest (R. 325 at 55). 
Ultimately, the trial court appointed conflict counsel for Scuderi on August 30, 
2001 and scheduled a hearing for September 11, 2001, to set a trial date (R. 355 at 3-4). 
However, Scuderi asserts that the LDA had no conflict in representing him, and that the 
trial court failed to uncover any conflict in open court. Kreeck Mendez filed an affidavit 
denying the State's accusations (R. 168-73). Moreover, Sterling explained to the trial 
court that he was ready to try the case and he did not believe there was any conflict (R. 
331 at 15-16). 
Scuderi asserts that any delays caused by the appointment of additional conflict 
counsel to represent him are attributable to the State. The State knew from day one that 
Mahoney would be their key witness. The police discovered all incriminating evidence 
in Mahoney's garage and Mahoney ultimately fingered Scuderi as the owner of these 
items (R. 327: 199-201). Yet the State waited from October 18, 2000, when Scuderi was 
originally charged, until August 16, 2001, just 14 days before the trial was scheduled to 
begin, to bring up the conflict issue (R. 4; 325 at 46). Thus, the State waited months to 
bring this issue before the trial court, up until the eve of trial. Moreover, the State was 
aware that the 120-day detainer period was still in effect, yet insisted that knew trial 
counsel be appointed, even though no real conflict existed (R. 331 at 19). Accordingly, 
any further delays caused by the appointment of additional conflict counsel cannot be 
considered "good cause" because the State waited until the last minute to bring up the 
issue and the court failed to show in open court that a conflict really existed. Moreover, 
the trial court never asked Scuderi if he wanted knew trial counsel or if he desired to 
continue the trial as scheduled on August 30, 2001. 
As a result of the trial court delaying the trial again, Sharon Preston was appointed 
counsel for Scuderi (R. 197). Preston filed a motion to continue the September 11 
hearing until October 4, 2001 (R. 199, 203). At the October 4 hearing, Preston expressed 
her readiness to proceed with trial (R. 363 at 3). Despite the 120-day disposition, the trial 
court gave only two possible dates for trial, one sometime in November and on in 
December (R. 363 at 3). Preston had a conflict with the November date, so trial was set 
for December 19-20, 2002 (R. 363 at 3). 
Scuderi asserts that the State should have objected to this late trial schedule in 
light of his 120-day disposition. The trial court failed to explain in "open court" why no 
earlier date was available for trial, and the earliest possible date should have been 
granted. In Wagenman, the State passively sat by and allowed the trial court to 
reschedule the defendant's trial without making a determination of good cause in open 
court. Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146 at \\5. Because good cause for delaying the trial 
could not be shown on the record, the case was dismissed with prejudice. Id. at ^ [16. 
Scuderi asserts that his case had priority on the trial court's calendar, and but for 
good cause show in open court, his trial should have been scheduled to the earliest day 
possible to comply with the already overlooked 120-day disposition. See Utah Code 
Annotated § 77-29-1. The State's failure to ensure that the 120-day disposition be fully 
complied with, which resulted in an additional delay of approximately a one-month 
period, surely went beyond the 120-day period beginning November 7, 2001. 
Unsurprisingly, although trial was set to finally begin December 19, 2001, another 
delay occurred. The State moved to continue the trial due to a witness being unavailable 
(R. 210). While Scuderi concedes that this continuance was for good cause, the trial 
court set the trial date on March 20, 2002, a full 92 days after December 19, 2001 (R. 356 
at 5-6). 
Scuderi asserts that the State again failed its "affirmative obligation to ensure that 
good cause" for such a prolonged continuance be shown in "open court." See Wagenman, 
2003 UT App 146 at ^15. In State v. Heaton, this Court acknowledged that setting a trial 
"one month beyond the disposition period was not unreasonable" considering both 
defense counsel and the prosecutor heavy schedules. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917. However, 
in Heaton, the trial court showed in open court that this delay constituted good cause 
because of both parties' considerable schedules. Id. 
But in State v. Coleman, any delay outside of the 120-day period must be "a 
relatively short delay caused by unforeseen problems arising immediately prior to trial." 
2001 UT App 281 at \6. In this case, the State expressed that it would be ready for trial 
mid-January 2003 (R. 356 at 5). However, the trial court stated, "we can't go then, 
practically speaking. The earliest we could practically go would be sometime after the 
Olympics, late February early March" (R. 356 at 5). Again, the State failed its 
affirmative duty to make sure good cause for this lengthy delay was shown in open court. 
Under Wagenman, trial should have been scheduled as early as possible. The trial court 
gave no explanation why the trial could not be set in January 2002, and the State did not 
request an explanation. 
Moreover, the further delay because of the Olympics cannot be considered an 
"unforeseen problem" that the trial court was not aware of. See Coleman, 2001 UT App 
281 at [^6. Delaying the trial until March 19, 2002, was in and of itself unreasonable. 
Even more, the trial court failed to show in open court why such a prolonged delay was 
necessary considering the priority of Scuderi's 120-day disposition. 
Not only did Scuderi repeatedly inform the trial court of his 120-day disposition, 
but he made a motion to dismiss based upon the State's failure to prosecute this case 
within the 120-day detainer period (R. 290; 332 at 3; 351 at 4-5; 356 at 5). The trial court 
acknowledged receipt of this motion at a hearing on October 18, 2002 (R. 332 at 6). 
Scuderi asserts that if the trial court had properly considered this motion to dismiss, the 
motion would have been granted, the conviction vacated, and the matter dismissed. 
Accordingly, Scuderi asks this court to reverse his conviction and order the matter 
dismissed. 
D. In the Alternative, Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for Failing to Make a 
Motion To Dismiss Because the Case Was Not Tried Within the 120-Day 
Disposition Period 
In the alternative that this Court determines that Scuderi's first issue was not 
preserved, Scuderi asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a 
motion to dismiss since his case was not brought to trial within the 120-day disposition 
period. 
"In order to bring a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim, appellant 
must show that his trial counsel's performance was deficient, in that 'it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness,' and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
outcome of the trial.'" State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. 
Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687-88, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)); accord State v. 
Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App. 1993). 
The 120-day disposition was served to the appropriate authority on November 7, 
2000 (R. 20). The 120-day period ended on April 12, 2001, taking into account the 37 
day extension resulting from continuances for roll call (R. 347 at 2-3; 348 at 203). 
However, this case was not brought to trial until March 19, 2002; about 17 months after 
the 120-day disposition was filed. Scuderi repeatedly requested his trial counsel to make 
a motion to dismiss this case, but his counsel repeatedly failed to do so (R. 332 at 6). 
Moreover, the record shows that Scuderi repeatedly asserted this right at several hearings, 
even though it is the State's full responsibility to do so. See Wagenman, 2003 App 146 at 
^[15. Accordingly, Scuderi asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
make a motion to dismiss considering that the State failed in its duty to bring this case to 
trial within the 120-day period, which first expired on April 12, 2001. But for this 
failure, Scuderi asserts that the motion to dismiss would have been granted. Accordingly, 
Scuderi asks this Court to dismiss this case with prejudice. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING 
SCUDERFS MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE POLICE 
ACTED IN BAD FAITH BY DESTROYING ALL THE EVIDENCE 
WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO 
FINGERPRINTING TESTS WHICH MIGHT HAVE EXONERATED 
SCUDERI 
Scuderi asserts that the police acted in bad faith when they destroyed all the 
physical evidence that could have been subjected to fingerprint testing and that the trial 
court abused its discretion by denying his motion to suppress the evidence. This action 
denied Scuderi his rights to a fair trial because the destroyed evidence may have proven 
exculpatory in nature if his fingerprints were not found on the items while the fingerprints 
others were. 
Without question, the determination of whether specific police conduct rises to the 
level of bad faith is a question of law, reviewed under a correctness standard. 
However, because the determination of bad faith turns on 'the quintessential 
factual question of intent/ the bad-faith legal standard 'is one that conveys a 
measure of discretion to the trial judge when applying that standard to a given set 
of facts, it is impossible for us to precisely define the scope of that discretion other 
than to say that 'we would not anticipate a close, de novo review. On the other 
hand, a sufficiently careful review is necessary to assure that the purposes of the 
[bad-faith] requirement are served. Accordingly, we apply an abuse-of-discretion 
standard of review. 
State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 324, cert denied 922 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998) (citations 
omitted). 
If the actions of the trial court are inherently unfair, it has abused its discretion. 
See State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 193 (Utah 1990); see also State v. Schwietzer, 943 
P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1997). 
"Regarding cases when the state has failed 'to preserve evidentiary material of 
which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of 
which might have exonerated the defendant,' a defendant must show 'bad faith on the 
part of the police.' Bad faith requires that a defendant prove more than mere negligence; 
a defendant must show that 'the police ... by there conduct indicate that the evidence 
could form a basis for exonerating the defendant.'" Holden, 964 P.2d at 323 (citation 
omitted). 
Instate v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, cert. denied922 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998), Holden's 
neighbor complained to the police that a large number of people were visiting the 
defendant's residence, and that he suspected drug activity. 964 P.2d at 319. The police 
installed a video camera in the neighbor's home to record Holden's activity. Id. After a 
few days of videotaping, the police went to retrieve the camera and noticed Holden put a 
large bag and a small bag on the edge of the road pavement apparently for trash 
collection. Id. The officers took the bags and a few boxes of loose garbage and searched 
it. Id. In the bags the officers found various drug paraphernalia with and without drug 
residue. Id. The police separated the incriminating items, marked and saved them, and 
threw away the rest of the garbage. Id. at 319-20. Based on the incriminating items found 
in the bags, videotaped visits of over 52 cars on the 52 hour videotape, and statements by 
confidential informants, the police obtained a search warrant of the Holden's home and 
found paraphernalia, marijuana seeds, and stems in his home. Id. at 320. 
Holden filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the bags, asserting that the 
police acted in bad faith for failing to preserve "potentially useful evidence from their 
search of the trash bags." Holden, 964 P.2d at 320. The trial court denied the motion, 
concluding that the police had not acted in bad faith when they destroyed non-
incriminating evidence from the search of the trash bags. Id, Holden then entered a plea 
of guilty to several counts of possession of controlled substances. Id. at 320. 
Holden argued on appeal that the evidence should be suppressed because "the 
evidence in the trash bag was potentially useful to show the bags were not" his or that he 
"had not had control of them for some time." Holden, 964 P.2d at 323. Holden argued 
that the police acted in bad faith when they failed to save evidence because "the burden 
of preservation was minimal" and because the police did not consult police procedures 
before destroying the trash. Id. at 324. 
This Court observed that the defendant in Holden "does not argue that the 
evidence in the trash bags was exculpatory. Rather, he contends only that the evidence in 
the trash bags was potentially useful." 964 P.2d at 323. This Court then held that the 
defendant had the burden of proving that "the police ... by their conduct indicate[d] that 
the evidence [destroyed] could form a basis for exonerating the defendant" because the 
destroyed evidence "could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have 
exonerated the defendant." Id. at 324. 
This Court concluded that the trial court's findings "are clear, and [the defendant] 
does not dispute them. The trial court explicitly found no evidence ... that the police, by 
their conduct or otherwise, knew that any evidence was exculpatory or had potential 
value to" the defendant. Holden, 964 P.2d at 324. This Court then held that the motion 
was properly denied because "the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding 
that the police had not acted in bad faith in simply doing with the rest of his garbage what 
[the defendant] intended would be done with it, i.e., disposing of it." Id. 
Scuderi asserts that the officer's actions in this case are distinguishable form 
Holden. Furthermore, in this case the trial court made no factual findings. Therefore, 
Scuderi asserts that this issue should be reviewed under "a close, de novo review," or at 
least "a sufficiently careful review ... to assure that the purposes of the [bad-faith] 
requirement are served." Holden, 964 P.2d at 324. 
In this case, the officer destroyed all the evidence that could have been subjected 
to fingerprinting tests before Scuderi had a chance to conduct the tests (R. 117; 326: 160). 
Unlike Holden, where the police kept the incriminating evidence and only destroyed the 
non-incriminating trash that the defendant intended to dispose of anyway, the officer in 
this case destroyed all the evidence which might have exonerated Scuderi. See Holden, 
964 P.2d at 324. 
This case is further distinguishable from Holden because the defendant did not 
dispute the trial court's factual findings regarding the destruction of evidence. 964 P.2d at 
324. However, in this case the trial court made no factual findings regarding the 
destruction of evidence and only concluded: 
Defendant failed to meet his burden of proof that the officers knew when they 
destroyed the clandestine laboratory equipment that it had exculpatory value. The 
Defendant failed to demonstrate the Officers acted in bad faith in destroying the 
evidence. 
(R. 187-88). Scuderi asserts that the officer's knew or should have known that the 
destroyed evidence had potential value to him in that it might have exonerated him. 
The results from such tests might have shown that Scuderi's prints were not on 
any of the items; or the results might have uncovered other individuals' fingerprints on 
the laboratory items, either of which might exonerate him. By testing for fingerprints on 
only one or two of the items and then destroying all of the items without further testing, 
the police indicated by their own conduct that this evidence could form the basis for 
exonerating Scuderi (R. 115; 117; 326: 154, 163). 
The police had to be aware that fingerprints might be on all of the items gathered 
as evidence, otherwise there would have been no reason to fingerprint any of the 
evidence (R. 326: 112). If all the items had been fingerprinted and Scuderi's prints were 
not found on any of the items, that would tend to exonerate him. If all the items were 
tested for fingerprints and other individuals' fingerprints were found on the items, that 
would certainly be useful to Scuderi because it would support his theory that the lab was 
not his and that he had no control over it. It would suggest that people other than Scuderi 
exercised control over the lab. The police obviously knew that if Scuderi's prints were 
not found on any of the items or if other individuals' prints were found on the items, this 
evidence could form a basis for exonerating him. 
Accordingly, the police acted in bad faith by destroying all the physical evidence 
which should have been subjected to fingerprint testing, the results of which might have 
exonerated Scuderi. Therefore, the trial court's conclusion was in error and the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying Scuderi's motion to suppress. 
III. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MAKE 
A MOTION FOR MISTRIAL OR TO REQUEST A CURATIVE 
INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE INTRODUCTION OF 
INADMISSIBLE PRIOR BAD ACTS EVIDENCE, AND THIS 
ERROR VIOLATED SCUDERFS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
Before trial, the trial court ordered that the State could not introduce any evidence 
in its case in chief that Scuderi was on parole or that he had been previously convicted of 
a clandestine laboratory (R. 191-92). However, at trial, the State's key witness asserted 
at least five times that Scuderi had just "gotten out of prison" or "was going back to 
prison" (R. 327: 183, 186, 189, 216, 261). The prosecutor also purposefully elicited this 
information from Nancy Vaughn, a defense witness (R. 327: 304). Scuderi asserts that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a motion for mistrial or for failing to 
request a curative instruction from the court. But for this deficient performance, a more 
favorable outcome was likely. Scuderi accordingly asks this Court to reverse his 
conviction and remand this matter to the District Court. 
"In order to bring a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim, appellant 
must show that his trial counsel's performance was deficient, in that 'it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness,' and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
outcome of the trial.'" State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). 
"[Bjefore we will reverse a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, we 
must be persuaded that there was a 'lack of any conceivable tactical basis' for counsel's 
actions." Id. (quoting State v. Moritzsky, 111 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989)). 
A. Trial Counsel's Failure To Object To Repeated References That Scuderi Had 
Been In Prison Fell Below An Objective Standard of Reasonableness 
Scuderi first asserts that his trial counsels' performance was deficient for failing to 
object to numerous statements that he was previously in prison. When his trial counsel 
finally objected to the prosecutor eliciting such information, defense counsel failed to 
make a motion for a mistrial or request a curative instruction from the court. 
It is well established that prior bad acts evidence is not admissible "to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." State v. Holbert, 
2002 UT App 426, %L9, 61 P.3d 291 (quoting Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404(b)). 
Moreover, 
[W]e have numerous rules of evidence that prohibit the introduction of defendant's 
past criminal conduct solely to assure that a case will be decided on the facts 
untainted by past misconduct. It is axiomatic that cases should be decided on the 
facts, and not on prejudice, by whatever means the prejudice may insinuate itself. 
The potential effect on the minds of jurors in attempting to apply the presumption 
of innocence and the standard requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt to the 
evidence in a criminal case, require it. 
Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 345 (Utah, 1980). 
Before trial, the trial court granted Scuderi's motion to exclude evidence regarding 
prior bad acts (R. 191-92). At trial, the prosecutor claimed outside the presence of the 
jury that the State was being prejudiced by the trial court's order limiting 404(b) evidence 
(R. 326: 105). The prosecutor claimed that for the State's witness, Officer Daniels, to 
answer truthfully, he would need to explain that the reason he did not record an interview 
with Scuderi was because "we were in prison, we interviewed him in prison, they 
wouldn't allow us to have a tape." (R. 326: 106). However, the trial court once again 
ordered that such evidence was inadmissible unless defense counsel opened the door (R. 
326: 106-07). 
A short time later, the trial court once again reiterated its pre-trial order that the 
fact that Scuderi was on probation could not be admitted (R. 326: 148). Despite this 
order, the prosecutor improperly elicited evidence from Nancy Vaughn, a defense 
witness, that Scuderi was in prison. During cross examination, Vaughn testified that she 
had some contact with Scuderi after the police found the items in Mahoney's garage; she 
had received a birthday card and a short letter form Scuderi (R. 327: 314). The 
prosecutor then asked, "So the letter and the card came through the mail?" (R. 327: 314). 
Vaughn responded affirmatively, and the prosecutor then asked, "Where did they come 
from?" (R. 327: 304). Vaughn responded, "From prison" (R. 327: 304). It is evident 
from the record that the prosecutor knew that Scuderi was in prison at the time when 
Vaughn received this communication from Scuderi and the prosecutor knew what 
Vaughn's answer would be. Defense counsel immediately objected and the trial court 
sustained the objection, but the court failed to issue any curative instruction (R. 327: 
304). 
Moreover, Felice Mahoney, the State's key witness, volunteered at least five times 
that Scuderi was in and out of prison around the time in question (R. 327: 183, 186, 189, 
216, 261). Defense counsel allowed Mahoney to state three times that Scuderi had been 
in prison before objecting to this inadmissible evidence, but the trial court overruled the 
objection despite its previous pre-trial order (R. 327: 216). Even though defense counsel 
failed to object to the repeated references by the State's key witness that Scuderi had 
previously been in prison, the trial court was well aware of these violations of its previous 
limiting order. At the close of testimony, the trial court stated to both attorneys: 
Counsel, there were references in the testimony of [Mahoney], and also the - 1 
believe it was the second defendant's witness, as to the fact Mr. Scuderi was in 
prison when these letters were written. I overruled the objection a couple of times, 
because I think there were earlier references, maybe three where there was no 
objection made about the fact that he had been in prison, by [Mahoney]. Plus the 
fact on cross examination of one of the State's witnesses yesterday, it was 
mentioned he was interviewed in a penal institution or detention facility of some 
kind. I don't think it is a mystery to the jury at this point that Mr. Scuderi is in 
custody. 
(R. 327: 311-12). 
Scuderi asserts that the admission of this prior bad acts evidence not only violated 
the pre-trial order limiting such evidence, but it also violated his rights to a fair trial and 
the presumption of innocence since this evidence showed his criminal propensity to 
commit crime thereby prejudicing the jury against him. Scuderi asserts that because the 
jury obviously knew that he had formerly been in prison, the prejudicial effect upon the 
jury is similar to State v. Chess, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah, 1980). 
In Chess, the defendant was tried before a jury in identifiable prison clothes. The 
defendant told his trial counsel that he objected to wearing prison clothes at trial; 
however, his trial counsel failed to make an objection at trial and the defendant was 
convicted of aggravated robbery. 617 P.2d at 344. The defendant claimed on habeas 
relief that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to his appearing in prison 
clothes. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court determined that "[t]he [defendant] should not be held 
responsible for counsel's failure to make an objection to protect a basic constitutional 
right, especially when it is difficult to conceive of a valid tactical or strategic reason for 
not objecting." Chess, 617 P.2d at 344. The Court then overturned the conviction, 
holding, "The prejudicial effect that flows from a defendant's appearing before a jury in 
identifiable prison garb is not measurable, and it is so potentially prejudicial as to create a 
substantial risk of fundamental unfairness in a criminal trial." Id. The Court further 
added, "Indeed, we have numerous rules of evidence that prohibit the introduction of 
defendant's past criminal conduct solely to assure that a case will be decided on the facts 
untainted by past misconduct. It is axiomatic that cases should be decided on the facts, 
and not on prejudice, by whatever means the prejudice may insinuate itself. The potential 
effect on the minds of jurors in attempting to apply the presumption of innocence and the 
standard requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the evidence in a criminal case, 
require it." Id. at 345. 
Like Chess, Scuderi asserts that there was no strategic reason to not object to the 
repeated references that he had been in prison. Even the trial court frankly admitted that 
the jury knew that Scuderi had been committed to prison (R. 327: 311-12). And just like 
the prison clothes improperly called attention to matters that should not have been 
considered by the jury, the jury should not have known that Scuderi had previously been 
committed to prison for past crimes. 
Accordingly, Scuderi asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to the repeated references that he had been in prison since these statements 
violated his rights to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence. Moreover, trial 
counsel should have known the prejudicial effect that these repeated references would 
have had on the jury and trial counsel should have been aware that these repeated 
references violated the pre-trial court ruling in limine and Rule 404(b). 
B. Trial Counsel's Deficient Performance Prejudiced The Outcome Of The Trial 
Scuderi asserts that but for trial counsel's deficient performance, he would have 
received a more favorable outcome. As shown above in Point A, the Utah Supreme 
Court emphasized in Chess that "numerous rules of evidence ... prohibit the introduction 
of defendant's past criminal conduct solely to assure that a case will be decided on the 
facts untainted by past misconduct." Chess, 617 P.2d at 345. Rule 404(b) prevents the 
introduction of evidence that might impermissibly show a propensity to commit crime. 
See State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f56, 52 P.3d 1210. Thus, "one accused of a crime is 
entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence 
introduced at trial...." State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, }^20, 40 P.3d 611 (citation omitted). 
Scuderi asserts that introducing evidence that he had been in prison impermissibly 
impressed upon the minds of the jurors that he was more likely to have committed this 
offense for which he was being tried than if he had previously led a blameless life. 
The evidence in this case against Scuderi hinged almost entirely upon the 
testimony of Felice Mahoney, the lady who owned the garage where the meth lab was 
found. Although there was ample evidence that a meth lab was found in Mahoney's 
garage, the only testimony clearly linking Scuderi to the meth lab came from Mahoney. 
However, several witnesses contradicted Mahoney's testimony and testified in behalf of 
Scuderi. Nancy Vaughn testified that Mahoney told her that the items in the garage 
belonged to someone other than Scuderi (R. 327: 295-96. 298). And James Scuderi 
testified that Scuderi was working with him and could not have been at Mahoney's 
garage during the times she claimed he was there (R. 327: 307). 
Thus, witness credibility was the significant issue before the jury, and the jury had 
to determine Scuderi's guilt or innocence largely based on whether they thought Scuderi 
was the type of person to operate a meth lab. The jury should have decided this case on 
the properly admitted evidence alone. However, the fact that the jury impermissibly 
knew that Scuderi had previously served time in prison unfairly prejudiced the minds of 
the jurors as this prior bad acts evidence put before the jury matters it should not have 
considered. Evidence that Scuderi had recently been in prison impermissibly tainted the 
outcome of this case causing the jury to believe Mahoney's testimony over that of 
Vuaghn's and James Scuderi's. 
Accordingly, but for trial counsel's failure to move for a mistrial or request a 
curative instruction from the trial court, the outcome would have been different. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Scuderi asks this Court to reverse his conviction or in 
the alternative, conclude that his trial counsel's performance was deficient and remand 
this case for a new trial. 
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77-28c-201 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 512 
forceable, the remaining provisions of the compact shall be 
enforceable 
(b) The provisions of this compact shall be liberally con 
structed to effectuate its purposes 
ARTICLE XIV 
BINDING EFFECT OF COMPACT AND OTHER LAWS 
(a) Other Laws 
(1) Nothing herein prevents the enforcement of any 
other law of a compacting state tha t is not inconsistent 
with this compact 
(2) All compacting states' laws conflicting with this 
compact are superseded to the extent of the conflict 
(b) Binding Effect of the Compact 
(1) All lawful actions of the Interstate Commission, 
including all rules and by-laws promulgated by the Inter-
state Commission, are binding upon the compacting 
states 
(2) All agreements between the Interstate Commission 
and the compacting states are binding in accordance with 
their terms 
(3) Upon the request of a party to a conflict over 
meaning or interpretation of Interstate Commission ac 
tions, and upon a majority vote of the compacting states, 
the Interstate Commission may issue advisory opinions 
regardmg such meaning or interpretation 
(4) In the event any provision of this compact exceeds 
the constitutional limits imposed on the legislature of any 
compacting state, the obhgations, duties, powers, or juris-
diction sought to be conferred by such provision upon the 
Interstate Commission shall be ineffective and such obli-
gations, duties, powers, or jurisdiction shall remain m the 
compacting s tate and shall be exercised by the agency 
thereof to which such obligations, duties, powers, or 
jurisdiction are delegated by law in effect at the t ime this 
compact becomes effective 2001 
PART 2 
AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNOR TO ENTER INTO 
COMPACT 
77-28c-201. Authority of governor to jo in compact . 
The governor of Utah is authorized and directed to execute 
a compact on behalf of this state with any other s tate or states 
joining the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision 
as provided m Section 77-28c-103 2001 
CHAPTER 29 
DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS 
Section 
77-29-1 Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending 
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Contin-
uance may be granted — Dismissal of charge 
for failure to bring to trial 
77-29-2 Duty of custodial officer to inform prisoner of 
untried indictments or informations 
77-29-3 Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons 
77-29-4 Escape of prisoner voids demand 
77-29-5 Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment 
into law — Text of agreement 
77-29-6 Interstate agreement — "Appropriate court" de-
fined 
77-29-7 Interstate agreement — Duty of s tate agencies 
and political subdivisions to cooperate 
77-29-8 Interstate agreement — Application of habitual 
criminal law 
Section 
77-29 9 Interstate agreement — Escape of prison 
m temporary custody ^We 
77-29 10 Interstate agreement — Duty of warden 
77-29 11 Interstate agreement — Attorney general 
mimstrator and information agent S ^ 
77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of De H 
charge — Duties of custodial officer — £ 0 ^ 
uance may be granted — Dismissal of ch *** 
for failure to bring to trial. *»e 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprison 
in the state prison, jail or other penal or correctional inst * 
tion of this state, and there is pending against the prisone U 
this state any untried indictment or information, and th^ 
prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial ofn 
in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a writt 
demand specifying the nature of the charge and the court 
wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the pend 
ing charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought to 
trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of 
the demand described m Subsection (1), shall immediately 
cause the demand to be forwarded by personal delivery or 
certified mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate 
prosecuting attorney and court clerk The warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attor 
ney so notified, provide the attorney with such mformation 
concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner 
as shall be requested 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Sub 
section (1), the prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his 
counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with the prisoner 
or his counsel being present, may be granted any reasonable 
continuance 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 
days, or withm such contmuance as has been granted, and 
defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the action, the court 
shall review the proceeding If the court finds that the failure 
of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within 
the time required is not supported by good cause, whether a 
previous motion for continuance was made or not, the court 
shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice 1980 
77-29-2. Duty of custodial officer to inform prisoner of 
untried indictments or informations. 
The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall promptly 
inform a prisoner m writing of the source and contents of any 
untried indictments or informations agamst that prisoner 
concerning which he has knowledge and of that prisoner's 
right to make a request for final disposition thereof 1980 
77-29-3. Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons. 
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person 
while adjudged to be incompetent to proceed under Chapter 
15 1980 
77-29-4. Escape of prisoner voids demand. 
Escape from custody by a prisoner after delivery of the 
written demand referred to in Subsection 77-29-1(1) shall void 
the request 1980 
77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enact-
ment into law — Text of agreement. 
The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby enacted 
into law and entered into by this state with all other jurisdic-
tions legally joining therein in the form substantially as 
follows 
The contracting states solemnly agree that 
To: Honorable Judge Reese 
From: Scot Scuderi #26983 
Re: Appeals Notice/Motions 
P y
 / 8/8/02 
--n 
Av 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 2 0 2002 
Dear Sir; SALTvush^ cqyNTY 
I am writing you today for a few concerns. Jhirst'l^totMputjKfcw^ the courts of my 
intent to appeal the trial, as well as the sentencing to the appeals courts. My counsel 
failed to motion to dismiss on the grounds of my 120-day speedy trial issue. And thus has 
miss-represented my case issues. 
Second I would like to ask the courts for the credit of the twenty-two months time 
served on this case. 
Third I would like to submit the motion to dismiss on the 120-day disp. right to 
speedy trial issue myself. 
Sincerely Yours, 
Scot Scuderi 
CC- Colleen Colborne AG Office 
Sharron Preston Attorney 
>rd 3 a District Court 
450 So. State St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 84111 




Re; Motion of Appeal, 
and request for new 
Counsel. 
ATTN: Judge Robin Reese, or presiding Judge 
Motion to d ismiss 
120-Day Disp . 
Your Honor, I would like to submit to the court this request as a motion and hope 
the court will recognize this as such and also to guide me in the correct procedures in this 
matter, as I no longer recognize the services of the court appointed counsel, Sharon 
Preston, who I feel grossly misrepresented my wishes and who failed to keep me 
informed or see that I was in complete understanding of the legal proceedings of my case. 
Repeatedly I expressed myself to Ms. Preston my intent to my right for a fast and speedy 
trial. Too, which she assured me she would file the proper motion on my behalf? This she 
never did, nor did she address the court verbally as she assured me she would while we 
were awaiting to go before the court, for this reason I would appreciate that the court 
issue me new representation who will be willing to work with me in seeing what is in my 
best interests as I pursue the appeal of which I trust you will grant at this time. 
Respectfully 
^ ^ $ 2 ^ — ) 
MARK SHURTLEFF #4666 
Attorney General 
Colleen K. Coebergh #8052 
Assistant Attorney General 
348 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone (801)524-3080 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, Screened by: Gary Heward 
Assigned to: Colleen K. Coebergh 
Plaintiff, DAO # 00020874 
-vs-
SCOT KEN SCUDERI ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
DOB 02/15/57 DISMISS/MOTION TO 
AKA: NONE EXCLUDE EVIDENCE 
Utah State Prison 
157830059 Utah 




This matter having come before the Court on August 16th, 2001 for hearing on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Preserve Exculpatory Evidence or to Prevent the 
State from Introducing Evidence Not Preserved, the Defendant appearing personally and in 
person, and by and through his counsel, Otis Sterling, the State appearing by and through 
Colleen K. Coebergh, the Court having read and considered Defendant's Motion and 
accompanying Memorandum and the State's Response to the same, and the Court having heard 
and considered argument of the parties; finds: 
Defendant failed to meet his burden of proof that the Officers knew when they destroyed 
the clandestine laboratory equipment that it had exculpatory value. The Defendant failed to 
demonstrate the Officers acted in bad faith in destroying the evidence. 
Having failed to meet his burden of proof, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Exclude 
Evidence based on Destruction of the Evidence is DENIED. 
n A Dated this
 c>^ day of August, 2001. 
Honorable Robin Reese 
District Judge, Third District 
cc: 
Colleen K. Coebergh 
Otis Sterling 
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